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This paper aims to examine how the cost structure of certified public accountant firms changed after the accounting reform of 
2005. Korea enacted various accounting reform acts adopting Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2005. Our sample comprises 1,230 firm-year 
observations from 1997 to 2012. The sample period is decomposed into two sub-periods: pre-reform  
(1997–2004) and post-reform (2005–2012) periods. We estimate a multi-product translog cost function to determine whether there 
are significant changes in the economies of scale during the pre- and post- reform periods. The estimated cost function suggests that 
overall and product-specific economies of scale prevailed during the full sample, pre- and post-reform periods. However, overall 
economies of scale lessened after the accounting reform and the economies of scale seemed to be depleted for the larger firms 
during the full and post-reform periods. As for product-specific scale economies after the reform, the marginal costs of producing 
Audit and Accounting increased, whereas those of producing Tax services declined. The economies of scale in business advisory 
services remained constant before and after the accounting reform. The results gleaned from this study may provide CPA firms 
with managerial implications regarding the changes in cost structure after the accounting reform. 
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Introduction 
This paper investigates the changes in the cost structure 
of the certified public accountant (CPA) service industry 
before and after the accounting reform of 2005 in Korea. 
We estimate a multi-product translog cost function. The 
degrees of scale economies are determined using the 
estimated coefficients of the cost function. The U.S. 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a 
reaction to a battery of large-scale accounting 
malpractices in the early 2000s. In response to the 
perception of the need for stricter financial regulations, 
many non-U.S. regimes subsequently adopted SOX-type 
reform acts.1 Korea is one of the countries that have 
adopted the SOX-type regulations. Accounting reforms 
may affect the cost structure and operating efficiency of 
CPA firms. By law, a CPA firm is a special purpose 
company that carries out audit and accounting (A&A), tax 
services (TAX) and business advisory services (BAS).2 
The CPA service industry in Korea is highly competitive 
with quite homogenous services.3 Success in this industry 
depends on how well the firm controls total costs. Prior 
studies on the production structure of CPA firms have not 
incorporated a multi-product translog cost function to 
determine the effects of the accounting reform. If the scale 
economies of CPA firms are exacerbated by the reform 
acts, the firms’ managers can improve their efficiency by 
adjusting inputs or changing the output mix.  
Overview of the Accounting Reform in Korea 
Korea imitated the U.S. in adopting the essence of 
SOX and amended three existing laws: the Securities and 
exchange act (SEA), the act on External audit of stock 
companies (EASC) and the Certified public accountant 
act (CPAA). The amendments to the above laws have 
been in effect since April 2004. They require senior 
management and external auditors to certify the accuracy 
and completeness of financial reports, and to establish 
internal controls and reporting methods on the adequacy 
of the controls. Furthermore, the Securities-related class 
action act (SRCA) was newly enacted and enforced in 
January 2005. The SRCA applies to securities-related 
claims for damages caused by false information in 
business reports, stock price manipulation or negligent 
auditing by external auditors. The main objective of these 
laws is to protect investors by improving the reliability of 
corporate disclosures including accounting information. 
In this study, the accounting reform acts of 2005 
encompass the SEA, EASC, CPAA and SRCA that have 
been in effect since 2005. 
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Materials and Methods 
 
Translog Cost Function 
We specify a translog cost function to represent the 
relationship between total costs and revenues of the CPA 
service industry. We consider CPA firms producing 
multi-outputs using multi-inputs. The translog cost 
function with K input prices w= (w1, …, wK) > 0 and I 
outputs q= (q1, …, qI) > 0 can be expressed as follows:  
 
  … (1) 
 
where, lnC(∙) is the logarithm of total costs, lnqi is the 
logarithm of the quantity of output i, and lnwk is the 
logarithm of the price of input k.The symmetry condition 
requires that ckl=clk and eij=eji. Since input prices in the 
model are measured in monetary amounts, we write the 
price of each input k in the year t as wk
t = wk
97∙ρk
t  for 
k=1,…,K and t=1998, 1999,…, 2012. wk
t  (>0) is the 
factor measuring the change in price of input k in year t 
compared to 1997. We normalise input prices by setting 
wk
97= 1 for k (wk
t = ρk
t ). As it is difficult for researchers to 
observe input prices in the real world, we treat the wk
t  as 
parameters to be empirically estimated. We rewrite (1) as 
follows: 
 




t  and it is a parameter for the year dummy 
Yt.λi
tYt= ∑ fik( ln ρk
t )Kk=1  for t=1998,1999,…,2012 andi= 
1,…,I. Considering three outputs q1, q2 and q3, we can 





This analysis uses three output variables identified 
according to CPA firms’ business activities: A&A, TAX 
and BAS. In Eq. (3), q1, q2 and q3 indicate A&A, TAX 
and BAS, respectively. By not including input prices in 
(3), the cost function we estimate is indeed a 'pseudo-cost 
function', and we implicitly assume that firms try to 
minimise their costs. Big firms would benefit from 
carrying out a variety of tasks in a much more systematic 
manner than non-Big firms. This helps the big firms to 
manage their activities efficiently and cut down on the 
costs of servicing clients. On the other hand, given the 
output level, an increase in the size of firms increases the 
degree of difficulty in administration and therefore raises 
operating costs. Therefore, BIG-N is included in (3) as a 
control variable and measured as a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm is one of the Big firms. 
By taking the derivatives of (2) with respect to the 
price of each input, we obtain a system of cost share 






l=1 = ∑ ckl(lnwl
t)Kl=1  be γk
t Yt, Eq. (4) 




The parameters of the cost function are commonly 
estimated by treating (3) and (5) as a multivariate 
regression. Since the cost share equations add structural 
information without increasing the number of 
parameters, the multivariate regression of (3) in 
conjunction with (5) produces more efficient estimates 
than those achieved by (3) alone. We add disturbance 
terms to (3) and (5) for estimation.4 Generally, a CPA 
firm has three kinds of human resources: partners (PRT), 




other professionals (PRF) and other employees (OTH). 
PRT has ownership, acts as the highest executive and 
determines final decisions on the firm’s projects and 
activities. PRF includes registered CPAs but not 
partners, apprentice CPAs, information technology 
experts and consulting personnel, and PRF generally 
provides A&A, TAX and BAS services for individual 
clients. OTH supports partners and other professionals 
and is usually involved in the maintenance and 
administration of the firm. We consider the input of each 
firm in terms of its labour grouped into three human 
resources: the number of PRT, the number of PRF and 
the number of OTH. In Eqs (4) and (5), k=1, 2, 3 and 
each designation number stands for PRT, PRF and OTH 
in order. CPA firms provide their clients with A&A, 
TAX and BAS services by utilising human resources 
who have accounting expertise. We do not include 
capital inputs in our analysis because they are believed 
to be of only secondary importance.2 Since the cost 
shares sum to unity, one of the cost share equations is 
excluded from the estimation to avoid the singularity 
problem. The system of regression equations can be 
iteratively estimated using Zellner’s (1962) seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) algorithm.5 As the Cobb–
Douglas cost function is nested in the translog model, 
this paper conducts a statistical test to check whether the 
Cobb–Douglas function fits the data as well as the 
translog model. 
 
Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale pertain to whether a firm can 
reduce its total costs by increasing the output level. In 
the multi-output case, because average costs cannot be 
defined, the standard definition of scale economies 
cannot be applied. The concept of ray scale economies 
(RSCE) is a straight forward extension of the concept of 
single-output scale economies and indicates how total 
costs behave as the levels of all outputs change, holding 
output bundles fixed.6 In the translog cost function 
specified in Eq. (3), RSCE is given by the following: 
 
 … 6) 
where SCEi is the measure of the product-specific 
scale economies.7 A value of SCE less than one 
indicates that firms are operating in the region of 
increasing returns-to-scale. Returns-to-scale are said 
to be constant or decreasing when RSCE is equal to or 
greater than unity, respectively. 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper are obtained from the 
regulatory annual reports filed by CPA firms in Korea 
for each of the 16 years from 1997 to 2012. The 
sample period includes the accounting reform of 
2005. We break the sample period down into two sub-
periods: pre-reform (1997–2004) and post-reform 
(2005–2012). We include CPA firms that provide all 
three services in the sample to mitigate the 
misspecification problem due to fitting a translog cost 
function over sample firms that vary widely in output 
mix.8 After deleting unqualified observations, the final 
sample consists of 1230 firm-year observations: 377 
firms in the pre-reform period and 853 firms in the 
post-reform period. The list of variables and the 
definition and measurement thereof are presented in 
Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics on total costs, revenues, and 
labour variables are given in Table 2. Total costs are 
operating costs incurred during normal operations and 
the sum of labour and administrative costs. The high 
standard deviations of revenues suggest that CPA 
firms vary greatly in their size and output mix. The 
mean values of total costs, total revenues and total 
number of employees declined from the pre-reform 
period to the post-reform period. We perform paired t-
tests, and the results indicate that there are significant 
differences in both total costs and revenues between 
the two periods (not reported here). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Parameter Estimation of the Translog Cost Function 
The translog cost function specified in Eq. (3) and 
each of the cost share equations in Eq. (5) are 
estimated contemporaneously using Zellner’s 
technique.5 Zellner’s procedure is iterated until 
convergence to guarantee that the estimates are 
invariant to which cost share equation is dropped.9 
We estimate the cost function for the pre- and post- 
reform periods to examine the differences in the 
parameter estimates between the two periods. This 
paper employs the more flexible translog cost 
function rather than the log-linear Cobb–Douglas 
function.   We  conducted  likelihood   ratio   tests   to 




Table 1 — Variable Definitions and Measurements 
Variable Definition and Measurement 
N Number of observations 
C Total cost defined as operating costs reported on the income statement 
A&A Revenues from Audit and Accounting (A&A) 
TAX Revenues from TAX services (TAX) 
BAS Revenues from Business Advisory Services (BAS) 
PART% Proportion of partners 
PROF% 
Proportion of professionals that are registered CPAs who are not partners, apprentice CPAs, information technology experts and 
consulting personnel 
OTHR% Proportion of other employees that are support personnel usually involved in the maintenance and administration of the firm 
BIG-N 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CPA firm is one of the Big firms which are Samil-PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), 
Hanyoung-Ernst &Young (EY), Anjin-Arthur & Andersen (AA) and Samjung-Klynveld Peat Marwick & Goerdeler (KPMG) 
SCEi Measure of scale economies specific to a product i(i= 1, 2 and 3 denote A&A, TAX and BAS, respectively) 
RSCE Ray scale economies evaluated for each firm or sample mean 
Notes: Total costs and revenues are expressed in million Korean won. All monetary terms have been deflated to 2010 Korean won using 
the consumer price index published by the Bank of Korea. 
 
Table 2 — Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Panel A: full sample (1997–2012, N=1, 230) 
Total costs 15,262 45,605 3,123 5,060 7,753 
Revenues: 
Total revenues 15,732 46,587 3,252 5,213 8,102 
A&A 6,396 18,176 801 1,575 2,982 
TAX 2,655 8,270 510 958 1,712 
BAS 6,681 21,474 1,279 2,410 3,809 
Labour: 
Total number of employees 141 346 36 61 91 
PRT% 20.78 10.82 13.33 18.56 26.41 
PRF% 26.33 19.94 10.00 21.43 37.66 
OTH% 52.89 19.29 42.28 54.86 66.67 
Panel B: pre-reform (1997–2004,N=377) 
Total costs 16,199 38,969 2,782 4,968 9,236 
Revenues: 
Total revenues 16,866 40,794 2,820 5,015 10,141 
A&A 7,495 16,578 778 1,725 4,324 
TAX 2,157 5,031 430 942 1,687 
BAS 7,214 21,330 1,095 2,252 4,129 
Labour: 
Total number of employees 155 285 40 72 116 
PRT% 19.93 11.98 12.04 17.20 26.06 
PRF% 28.19 21.63 9.58 24.00 43.30 
OTH% 51.89 19.93 37.48 53.33 66.11 
Panel C: post-reform (2005–2012, N=853) 
Total costs 14,848 48,264 3,255 5,104 7,375 
Revenues: 
Total revenues 15,231 48,944 3,385 5,318 7,653 
A&A 5,911 18,829 808 1,561 2,685 
TAX 2,875 9,344 549 964 1,724 
BAS 6,446 21,546 1,354 2,441 3,661 
Labour: 
Total number of employees 135 370 35 59 82 
PRT% 21.15 10.25 14.12 19.23 26.52 
PRF% 25.52 19.09 10.00 21.05 36.51 
OTH% 53.34 18.99 44.28 55.56 66.67 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
 




evaluate whether the Cobb–Douglas form could have 
provideda more adequate representation of CPA 
firms’ cost function. 
The parameter estimates and the test results for the 
translog cost function are presented in Table 3. The 
estimates were calculated in five to seven iterations. 
The explanatory power of the function is high, as 
indicated by the McElroy R2 with a highly significant 
F-statistic. The likelihood ratio tests show that the 
Cobb–Douglas function is rejected by the data in 
favour of the translog model. The first-order 
parameters and the parameters that measure the 
interactions among the output levels are all 
significant. The estimated parameter of A&A 
decreases, while those of TAX and BAS increase in 
the post-reform years compared to the pre-reform 
period. This implies that the impact of A&A on 
operating costs was reduced after the accounting 
reform. The parameters of BIG-N are significant and 
negative for both the full sample and post-reform 
periods, implying that the Big firms strived to save 
operating costs during the full sample period and the 
cost savings were much larger in magnitude during 
the post-reform period than the pre-reform period. 
 
Economies of Scale 
To interpret the translog cost function reported in 
Table 3, we focus on economies of scale. In Table 4 
RSCE and SCEi, which are measured using the 
parameter estimates in Table 3 at the arithmetic 
means of lnq1, lnq2 and lnq3 for the full sample, pre- 
and post-reform periods are presented. Product-
Table 3 — Translog Cost Function Estimates 
Parameter 
Full Sample (1997–2012)  Pre-reform (1997–2004)  Post-reform (2005–2012) 
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 9.6646a 0.0221 9.6998a 0.0216 9.5881a 0.0099 
d1 0.4513
a 0.0169 0.4761a 0.0176 0.4209a 0.0097 
d2 0.1875
a 0.0213 0.1313a 0.0218 0.1572a 0.0098 
d3 0.3778
a 0.0164 0.3652a 0.0171 0.4291a 0.0107 
e11 0.1735
a 0.0038 0.1607a 0.0048 0.2117a 0.0056 
e22 0.1288
a 0.0039 0.0849a 0.0061 0.1587a 0.0042 
e33 0.1509
a 0.0038 0.1381a 0.0045 0.2253a 0.0067 
e12 −0.0577
a 0.0034 −0.0311a 0.0052 −0.0859a 0.0039 
e13 −0.1002
a 0.0035 −0.1101a 0.0047 −0.1249a 0.0049 
e23 −0.0608
a 0.0029 −0.0517a 0.0047 −0.0738a 0.0033 
𝜃1 −0.0566
a 0.0177 0.0349 0.0235 −0.1256a 0.0235 
λ1
98 −0.0099 0.0227 −0.0158 0.0231 
n/a n/a 
λ2
98 −0.0278 0.0291 −0.0213 0.0297 
λ3
98 0.0200 0.0201 0.0222 0.0205 
λ1
99 −0.0415c 0.0235 −0.0342 0.0239 
λ2
99 −0.0242 0.0288 −0.0233 0.0294 
λ3
99 0.0494b 0.0197 0.0561a 0.0202 
λ1
00 −0.0683a 0.0201 −0.0591a 0.0206 
λ2
00 0.0025 0.0274 −0.0049 0.0281 
λ3
00 0.0153 0.0203 0.0353c 0.0209 
λ1
01 −0.0092 0.0195 −0.0196 0.0199 
λ2
01 0.0272 0.0246 0.0262 0.0251 
λ3
01 0.0030 0.0195 0.0217 0.0201 
λ1
02 −0.0213 0.0196 −0.0152 0.0202 
λ2
02 0.0625a 0.0232 0.0608b 0.0239 
λ3
02 −0.0487b 0.0204 −0.0512b 0.0215 
λ1
03 −0.0288 0.0204 −0.0356c 0.0208 
λ2
03 0.0196 0.0243 0.0548b 0.0249 
λ3
03 −0.0159 0.0201 −0.0289 0.0209 
λ1
04 −0.0147 0.0193 −0.0169 0.0199 
λ2
04 −0.0456c 0.0239 0.0099 0.0247 
λ3
04 0.0806a 0.0196 0.0293 0.0209 
(Contd.) 




specific SCEi is often realised by specialising in the 
production of one or a few outputs over a larger scale 
of output. We also report RSCE and SCEi by quintile 
of output size for each sample period. 
According to the results in Table 4, RSCE and SCEi 
measures are significantly less than one for the full 
sample, pre- and post- reform periods, indicating that 
CPA firms on average exploit overall and product-
specific scale economies in providing their services. 
That is, an equally proportionate increase in all three 
outputs (A&A, TAX and BAS) results in a decline in 
ray average costs.10 The value of RSCE in the post-
reform period (0.9918, Panel C) is greater than that in 
the pre-reform period (0.9734, Panel B). This implies 
that the individual firm’s overall economies of scale 
lessened after the accounting reform of 2005. One must 
be careful about interpreting the results that CPA firms 
enjoy scale economies. Economies of scale may not 
necessarily be caused by the size of outputs, but they 
may be the results of the firms’ ability to lower total 
costs. To explore how economies of scale vary with 
firm sizes, we present RSCE and SCEi for each quintile 
of size vectors of outputs in Table 4. RSCE and SCEi 
measures increase in moving from the first quintile to 
the fifth quintile and differ significantly from zero, 
meaning that CPA firms’ overall economies of scale 
and product-specific scale economies diminish as firm 
sizes increase. RSCE seems to be exhausted, and even 
diseconomies of scale exist for large firms in the fifth 
quintile for the full sample and post-reform periods. 
Table 3 — Translog Cost Function Estimates — (Contd.) 
Parameter 
Full Sample (1997–2012)  Pre-reform (1997–2004)  Post-reform (2005–2012) 
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
 
λ1
05 0.0092 0.0193 
n/a n/a 
  λ2
05 −0.0279 0.0231 
λ3
05 −0.0241 0.0191 
λ1
06 −0.0342c 0.0200 −0.0129 0.0125 
λ2
06 0.0028 0.0234 0.0191c 0.0111 
λ3
06 0.0137 0.0204 0.0119 0.0132 
λ1
07 −0.0269 0.0193 −0.0059 0.0119 
λ2
07 −0.0006 0.0232 0.0214c 0.0111 
λ3
07 0.0136 0.0199 −0.0046 0.0129 
λ1
08 −0.0431b 0.0202 −0.0323b 0.0125 
λ2
08 0.0245 0.0232 0.0477a 0.0108 
λ3
08 0.0003 0.0189 0.0017 0.0117 
λ1
09 −0.0359c 0.0196 −0.0176 0.0121 
λ2
09 0.0188 0.0229 0.0378a 0.0107 
λ3
09 0.0065 0.0191 −0.0025 0.0119 
λ1
10 −0.0606a 0.0196 −0.0461a 0.0121 
λ2
10 0.0236 0.0229 0.0352a 0.0106 
λ3
10 −0.0105 0.0189 −0.0021 0.0117 
λ1
11 −0.0522a 0.0198 −0.0313b 0.0123 
λ2
11 0.0186 0.0228 0.0371a 0.0104 
λ3
11 0.0233 0.0196 0.0112 0.0126 
λ1
12 −0.0511a 0.0195 −0.0274b 0.0123 
λ2
12 0.0381c 0.0229 0.0529a 0.0108 
λ3
12 0.0058 0.0195 −0.0099 0.0126 
ϕt Included Included Included 
McElroy R2 0.988 0.991 0.991 
System DF 3581 1070 2498 
Number of Iterations 6 7 5 
LR test (H0: eij=0 for all i, 
j):Chi-square 
2623.4a 964.31a 1873.8a 
F-statistic 4256a 2933a 7428a 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-sided tests, 
respectively. 
 





The findings of this study are summarised as follows. 
First, CPA firms varied widely in their sizes and output 
mix, and both total costs and revenues declined from the 
pre-reform period to the post-reform period. Second, 
compared to the log-linear model, the translog model 
provided a more adequate representation of CPA firms’ 
cost function. Third, relative to other revenue sources, 
the impact of A&A on total costs decreased after the 
accounting reform. Fourth, the Big firms made more 
efforts to save total costs during the full sample period, 
and their cost savings were much bigger in magnitude 
during the post-reform period than the pre-reform 
period. Fifth, the estimated cost function suggests that 
overall and product-specific scale economies prevailed 
during the full sample, pre- and post- reform periods. 
CPA firms on average exhibited significant increasing 
returns-to-scale and product-specific returns-to-scale. 
However, RSCE lessened after the accounting reform of 
2005 and the scale economies appeared to be depleted 
for the larger firms during the full sample and post-
reform periods. Sixth, as for product-specific scale 
economies after the accounting reform, the marginal costs 
of producing A&A increased, whereas those of producing 
TAX declined. The scale economies in BAS remained 
constant before and after the accounting reform. 
The empirical evidence indicates that CPA firms 
enjoyed overall and product-specific economies of scale, 
though overall scale economies fell after the accounting 
reform of 2005. Despite these contributions, this study 
has limitations that are difficult to control the effect of 
factors other than the accounting reform on the cost 
function during the analysis period. Our study remains 
that of a single case, specifically in Korea. Therefore, it 
will be interesting to explore the relationships 
documented in our analysis in other countries that have 
enacted accounting reforms. 
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